

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 16-05-2003		2. REPORT TYPE FINAL		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Implications of the Policy of Preemption on Combatant Commanders				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) CDR Lesley S. Priest Paper Advisor (if Any):				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Joint Military Operations Department Naval War College 686 Cushing Road Newport, RI 02841-1207				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES A paper submitted to the faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.					
14. ABSTRACT Given the greater emphasis in the National Security Strategy (NSS) on the possible use of preemption, combatant commanders must reexamine their current capabilities and adapt them to ensure they are capable of executing preemptive operations. It is vital for combatant commanders to understand the nature of preemptive operations in order to be ready for preemptive operations. Although the new National Military Strategy (NMS) has not yet been published, and thus formal guidance to the military based on the new NSS has not been officially promulgated, American military forces are already engaged in a preemptive war in Iraq, such as President Bush outlined in his strategy. But, in order to continue to successfully engage American military forces in preemptive actions, combatant commanders must adapt and plan for such contingencies; for, in the past, they have planned for and been postured					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Preemption; Combatant Commanders; National Security Strategy					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 25	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Chairman, JMO Dept
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 401-841-3556

**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R. I.**

**IMPLICATIONS OF THE POLICY OF PREEMPTION ON COMBATANT
COMMANDERS**

By

**Lesley S. Priest
Commander, U.S. Navy**

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature:_____

16 May 2003

Abstract

Given the greater emphasis in the National Security Strategy (NSS) on the possible use of preemption, combatant commanders must reexamine their current capabilities and adapt them to ensure they are capable of executing preemptive operations. It is vital for combatant commanders to understand the nature of preemptive operations in order to be ready for preemptive operations. Although the new National Military Strategy (NMS) has not yet been published, and thus formal guidance to the military based on the new NSS has not been officially promulgated, American military forces are already engaged in a preemptive war in Iraq, such as President Bush outlined in his strategy. But, in order to continue to successfully engage American military forces in preemptive actions, combatant commanders must adapt and plan for such contingencies; for, in the past, they have planned for and been postured to fight mainly major theater wars that include time for planning and force build-up.

The New National Security Strategy: A Background

When President George W. Bush published his new National Security Strategy (NSS) in September of 2002, his vision inspired a debate and controversy, given its shift in strategy. The controversial element is the fact that the President brought the option of preemption to the fore. While preemption is not unprecedented in the U.S., it has not, until now, been so publicly an option in American strategy, especially because deterrence against enemy attacks has been the centerpiece of U.S. Strategy from the Cold War until the present. President Bush, however, recognizes that it is very difficult to deter terrorists, who may be willing to commit suicide in pursuit of their ends. As a result, he states, “We cannot let our enemies strike first.”¹ In fact, preemption has a basis in international law, “Nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack.”² The NSS continues, indicating the President’s preference to act multilaterally, however, “We will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country.”³

This document is considered by analysts like John Lewis Gaddis to be the first NSS that truly outlines a grand strategy for the United States. The President’s vision is compared with the last grand strategy, which was developed at the beginning of the Cold War, centered on the policy of containment of communism.⁴ President Bush’s NSS, written in the wake of the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), represents a significant shift in strategy that requires a concomitant shift in the way the American military conducts its business—the U.S. once again has a definite, though elusive, enemy in terrorism.

Introduction

Given the greater emphasis in the NSS on the possible use of preemption, combatant commanders must reexamine their current capabilities and adapt them to ensure they are capable of executing preemptive operations. It is vital for combatant commanders to understand the nature of preemptive operations in order to be ready for preemptive operations. Although the new National Military Strategy (NMS) has not yet been published, and thus formal guidance to the military based on the new NSS has not been officially promulgated, American military forces are already engaged in a preemptive war in Iraq, such as President Bush outlined in his strategy. But, in order to continue to successfully engage American military forces in preemptive actions, combatant commanders must adapt and plan for such contingencies; for, in the past, they have planned for and been postured to fight mainly major theater wars that include time for planning and force build-up.

What Is Preemption?

Contained in the NSS, is an explanation of what preemption means.

The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.⁵

The document says, "The United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats."⁶ Secretary of State, Colin Powell pointed out that preemption is not solely a military action, but that all other instruments of national power can be involved, including diplomatic, informational and economic measures. Mr. Powell also indicated that if preemption by force is used, it must be used decisively.⁷

In the future, preemptive operations may be large in scale such as in Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, preemption will probably more often take the form of smaller scale operations that run the gamut from extremely short notice and execution timelines (a matter of hours) to much longer timelines (months or years). In an analysis piece, Marvin Leibstone discusses the range of preemptive actions, dividing them in to three categories:

- 1) Immediate deployment of forces against something that is about to happen, with specific targets in mind These operations could range from small-scale special forces mission to mid- or large-scale conventional warfare activities.
- 2) [Operations involving] . . . overt long-term preparations, such as getting ready to attack Iraq in order to prevent Saddam Hussein from future deployment of [weapons of mass destruction (WMD)].
- 3) Deployment of forces responding to general rather than specific intelligence information . . . [involving] reconnaissance and surveillance actions as means to acquire targets. For example, a pre-emptive force responding to reliable reports that a terrorist group . . . is . . . operating within a particular region.⁸

Given such a range of possibilities, particularly when it comes to the quick response end, combatant commanders must adapt their forces to carry out their part of the new NSS.

On 1 June 2002, President Bush spoke at West Point:

The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology . . . occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends—and we will oppose them with all our power.⁹

President Bush has directed that the instruments of national security transform from their Cold War paradigms to be able to effectively counter today's threat—and this includes the U.S. military.¹⁰ Already, in the face of a new kind of war, this transformation is taking place.

The Transformation of Two Functional Combatant Commanders

Since the publication of the new Unified Command Plan (UCP) in April 2002, which itself contained relatively extensive changes, there have been two more UCP changes made which further augment the missions of various Unified Commands in response to the NSS. The purpose of the UCP is to establish “The missions, responsibilities and force structure for commanders of combatant commands and . . . [establish] their general geographic areas of responsibility (AOR) and functions.”¹¹ As a Senior Defense Official stated during a Pentagon briefing, “[The] responsibilities . . . [are pieces of] the broader adjustments that have taken place with respect to the unified commands.” Referring to the creation of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and the changes in mission for U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), he indicated that, “in all four cases, we have been trying to arrange those commands and give them the kinds of responsibilities and authorities that match the needs of the environment we are in and the one we anticipate.”¹² STRATCOM and SOCOM are particularly important unified commands in light of the policy of preemption. The changes in their missions reflect their roles in ensuring that a full range of preemptive options is available to the President, and that such operations can be carried out when ordered.

SOCOM’s Transformation

In the past, SOCOM was a force provider, who played a lesser role by supporting operations that were planned, supervised and executed by other combatant commanders.

SOCOM’s mission is to support the geographic . . . [combatant commanders], U.S. ambassadors and their country teams, and other government agencies by preparing SOF [special operations forces] to successfully conduct special operations, including civil affairs and psychological operations.¹³

In January 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced a greater role for SOCOM. Now SOCOM can be a supported commander, in that they “can now plan and execute their own hunt-and-destroy missions.”¹⁴ Secretary Rumsfeld explained the reasons:

The global nature of the war, the nature of the enemy and the need for fast, efficient operations in hunting down and rooting out terrorist networks around the world have all contributed to the need for an expanded role for the special operations forces.¹⁵

This new role means that regional combatant commanders, themselves, may support operations planned and executed by SOCOM. “The aim is to give [SOCOM] . . . the tools to find terrorists and then dispatch commandos to catch or kill them in a matter of hours, not days.”¹⁶ This is significant because SOCOM has global reach through its existing theater special operations commands (TSOCs). With this authority, special operations missions, under the auspices of SOCOM, can be more coordinated and synchronized world-wide. Furthermore, SOCOM will, in many cases, have control over its own operational timeline, which means that the commander can respond to threats faster than was previously possible. Such capabilities will prove to be extremely important when it comes to conducting quick-response, preemptive operations, especially during smaller-scale operations.

To enable SOCOM to function in its new role, the command will need additional planners to “beef up the operational planning staffs at SOCOM Headquarters...and at the six regional [TSOCs].”¹⁷ Additionally, SOCOM will need appropriate command and control equipment and tools to allow for planning and execution. SOCOM must continue to work closely with regional commands and allies¹⁸ to foster and strengthen relationships. Finally, SOCOM will acquire added intelligence capabilities to better carry out their missions.

SOCOM’s new capabilities have been recently tested in the preemptive Operation Iraqi Freedom. While the command cannot reveal details about the processes employed, as

retired Rear Admiral Steve Baker put it in an article about special operations in Iraq, “Essentially what [we’ve seen is that] . . . the strategy of future military operations has taken a major leap towards transformation We got to the point where we moved so fast that the enemy couldn’t react.”¹⁹ Working closely with the intelligence community, special operations forces reportedly had three critical objectives during the Iraqi conflict: 1) stunning and paralyzing Iraq’s command and control structure; 2) averting worst-case scenarios, and 3) providing CENTCOM with unparalleled situational awareness of the battlefield and the adversary’s condition.²⁰ A SOCOM spokesperson said of the command’s missions, “Success of our missions is dependent on speed, surprise and security.”²¹ Secretary Rumsfeld has talked of the military transformation, indicating that those aspects of conducting warfare are part of the transformation that has become so “critical in defending the nation in an age of terrorism and new adversaries.”²² In other words, these ways of waging war are a critical piece of U.S. forces’ ability to carry out preemptive warfare. SOCOM is one of the lead combatant commands in this transformation effort.

STRATCOM’s Transformation

On 1 October 2002, both STRATCOM and SPACECOM were disestablished and a new unified command that combined most of the previous missions of the old commands was established under the previously used name of United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM). As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, explained, this was neither a merger nor a takeover, “but the creation of a new command having a global perspective . . . [that would become] a pathfinder for the Pentagon’s military transformation plans.”²³ STRATCOM’s mission is to:

Establish and provide full-spectrum global strike, coordinated space and information operations capabilities to meet both deterrent and decisive national security

objectives. Provide operational space support, integrated missile defense, global [command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR)] . . . and specialized planning expertise to the joint warfighter.²⁴

With the two additional changes to the UCP, STRATCOM formally gained additional missions as part of the transformation effort in response to NSS directives, according to Rear Admiral James McArthur, “To stay ahead of the threat as it changes.”²⁵

The first new mission area is global strike, which “involves the ability to hit targets anywhere in the world within hours or minutes. Nuclear, conventional or non-destructive means such as computer network attack and jamming could be employed.”²⁶ Rear Admiral McArthur said further:

Under certain circumstances, and coordinated with the regional combatant commanders . . . [bombers or ships carrying cruise missiles, or intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) carrying conventional (non-nuclear) warheads] could be apportioned and allocated to Strategic Command for a specific, well-defined mission. It could very well be a preemptive, independent global strike.²⁷

Secretary Rumsfeld was more specific about global strike:

Striking an enemy powerfully, across great distances, with conventional rather than nuclear weapons (conventional strategic strike), and using space to disrupt enemy information systems including computers and satellites (information disruption). Together, these elements form the core of a “global strike” capability . . . [such that STRATCOM] can carry out military action designed to preempt an enemy from attacking the U.S. with, say, weapons of mass destruction. Put another way, global strike is an essential ingredient of [President] Bush’s newly announced foreign policy of ‘preemption.’²⁸

STRATCOM’s second new mission involves Department of Defense (DoD) Information Operations (IO), with STRATCOM as the “designated IO integrator for regional information operations, providing a global perspective and coordinating with other government agencies.”²⁹ This is the first time that IO has been assigned under one combatant

commander, a change which will enhance the DoD's ability to carry out IO in a coordinated and more effective manner, as well as preemptively, when necessary.

The third new mission is missile defense, which involves the "integration of . . . command and control, pulling together the warning, doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures."³⁰ Essentially, this will "'Operationalize' missile defense, integrating multiple layers of existing and emerging systems into a single architecture, and developing concepts of operation."³¹

Finally, the fourth new STRATCOM mission is Global C4ISR. This area will allow for a global C4ISR perspective and a much more coordinated and efficient use of the nation's relatively scarce C4ISR assets in order to "stay ahead of emerging threats."³² While such functions are vital in any military operation, they will be even more so in successfully accomplishing any preemptive operation, whether it is a rapid response type operation or one that involves months of planning and preparation. Without such information, the command cannot possibly gain enough insight into the threat to be able to launch an effective preemptive operation against it.

If STRATCOM is to be effective within the framework of President Bush's strategy, the command must be a strong advocate for gaining service support in making technological advances with respect to systems and forces required for each of its new mission areas. For example, by taking on the non-nuclear strategic strike portion of the global strike mission, STRATCOM is treading on new territory. In order to accomplish the mission, the command will need to advocate service investment platforms that are capable of striking globally, very quickly. Such platforms might include stealthy unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), long-range bombers and ICBMs with conventional warheads. For missile defense, a mission in its

infancy, new technology development will be mandatory. IO is another area that is relatively new and that has not previously been centralized. Certainly, STRATCOM will require that its staff gain experts in each of these areas for planning as well as execution. Finally, without the inflow of precise and timely quality intelligence, preemption will be impossible, for operations that must occur within hours or even days after indicators are received will require such information. In fact, any of the four new missions that support preemption will have that requirement.

Regional Commanders and Preemption: Implications

Within this new operating environment prescribed by the NSS, regional combatant commanders have retained their traditional roles within their respective areas of responsibility (AORs), as outlined in the UCP. Certainly, their focus remains on such responsibilities as protecting American interests, providing U.S. military representation and cultivating relationships in their areas, and conducting planning for potential operations within their AORs. Yet, several regional commanders will very likely take the lead in planning and executing preemptive operations as the GWOT continues. CENTCOM has already been placed in that position. Regional combatant commanders, therefore, must have a thorough understanding of the policy of preemption and develop the expertise and tools they will need to execute preemptive operations when they are called upon.

Transformation

Although the new NMS has not yet been published, the President has directed that the DoD will “continue to transform our military forces to ensure our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results.”³³ The problem of how the U.S. military will

prevent enemies from threatening the U.S., allies and friends with WMD is addressed on a strategic level:

Our response must take full advantage of strengthened alliances, the establishment of new partnerships with former adversaries, innovation in the use of military forces, modern technologies, including the development of an effective missile defense system, and increased emphasis on intelligence collection and analysis.³⁴

Regional combatant commanders must translate that direction to the operational level, integrating it into their own plans. Certainly, they are already involved to some degree with each of those areas; the difference, however, comes about with the policy of preemption. Commanders must realign some of their resources from the traditional way of thinking about, planning, and executing operations in order to be ready to carry out preemptive operations which will require different timelines as well as new flexibility in planning, and use of forces and equipment. The NSS lists key capabilities that must be integrated into military forces as they transform, “detection, active and passive defenses, and counter force capabilities— [must be] . . . integrated into our defense transformation. Counterproliferation must also be integrated into the doctrine, training and equipping of our forces and those of our allies to ensure that we can prevail in any conflict with WMD-armed adversaries.”³⁵ Combatant commanders will have to develop innovative visions for their commands’ future and be strong advocates of their plans in order to gain necessary, already scarce but required resources.

Working with Other Countries

The President recognizes the necessity of working closely with allies, coalition partners and other friendly countries, not only during conflict, but also during peacetime. In the NSS, he stated, “We are also guided by the conviction that no nation can build a safer, better world alone. Alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of

freedom-loving nations.”³⁶ When it comes to conducting coalition military operations, the U.S. strategy emphasizes the importance of sharing the defense burden, including combat operations, better developing the ability to conduct multi-national planning, sharing technological advances, developing compatible command and control structures, and sharing intelligence.³⁷ [We must] coordinate closely with allies to form a common assessment of the most dangerous threats.³⁸ Additionally, the NSS emphasizes the need for forward military presence overseas, as well as the need for overseas bases.³⁹ And, because “No doctrine can anticipate every circumstance in which U.S. action—direct or indirect—is warranted . . . , the United States should invest time and resources into building international relationships and institutions that can help manage local crises when they emerge.”⁴⁰

While diplomatic efforts are contained within the realm of the Department of State (DoS), regional combatant commanders are also tasked with numerous responsibilities for developing and fostering relationships within their respective AORs. A major tool that regional combatant commanders develop is the theater security cooperation plan (TSCP).

[The TSCP is a] strategic planning process intended to link . . . [combatant commander-planned] regional engagement activities with national strategic objectives It is the way the . . . [combatant commander] shapes the theater In addition to . . . planned and supported military operations, the . . . [TSCP] is an instrument used to prioritize peacetime military engagement activities . . . [which] ensures that all efforts in the theater focus on activities that are of greatest importance without sacrificing warfighting capability.⁴¹

TSCPs have become even more important given the GWOT and the preemptive strategy. Without peacetime ground work, it is difficult to instantly put together agreements with other countries for over flight or basing rights, for example, particularly during a short-notice operation. Regional combatant commanders must reevaluate their TSCPs from the new perspective of having to conduct a range of preemptive operations. During Operation

Enduring Freedom, the U.S. had to operate in Afghanistan, a landlocked country surrounded by countries not typically on its list of close allies. Yet, CENTCOM was able to secure basing rights in numerous surrounding countries, without which the operation would have failed. Such relationships take time and planning to cultivate.

Interagency Cooperation

The terrorist attacks on the U.S. have highlighted the need for much greater cooperation between U.S. government agencies across the board. Combatant commanders are no exception. In fact, especially in the current GWOT environment, enhanced cooperation with other agencies is as vital, if not more vital, to regional combatant commanders as cooperating with other countries. This is especially true when it comes to ensuring information sharing and coordinated planning. Regional combatant commanders are tasked with so many diverse responsibilities that unless they coordinate with other agencies, they will run out of resources and run the risk of planning or operating in a manner that does not fit within the overall national strategy.

Relationships with the Services

Because combatant commanders (the warfighters) rely on the services to procure, train and equip the forces they use, they must work closely with the services to ensure they are provided the correct forces and equipment required for the new strategy. Readiness to execute preemptive operations quickly has become a major new requirement that is likely to tax military forces and that will have to be thoroughly defined and monitored closely by combatant commanders. As a result, careful planning, with a thorough understanding of force requirements, will become even more important as shortfalls are identified and new programs are planned to address those shortfalls. Without service buy-in, combatant

commanders will be hard-pressed to make their plans work, particularly as future innovations are contemplated in order to provide the President the wider range of options he requires.⁴²

Close liaison with services at every level will be vital and must be on-going.

Liaison with Functional Combatant Commanders

Directly related to transformation, regional combatant commanders must understand functional combatant commanders' missions, especially when it comes to coordinating preemptive actions. Close liaison, coordination and exchange of information must be built into the day-to-day routine. And certainly functional combatant commanders will need to reciprocate that relationship in planning and executing the range of preemptive operations—particularly STRATCOM, with its global strike role, and SOF with its specialized capabilities.

Intelligence

Combatant commanders cannot begin to understand the new strategy, much less plan at the operational level without an accurate understanding of the situation in the world and specifically within their own AORs. Accurate, timely intelligence is the key to gaining that understanding. But, given the relatively new situation in this struggle against a new enemy, terrorism, the intelligence community must also transform by developing new collection methods and sources, means of conducting analyses, secure means of disseminating the intelligence to agencies and organizations that need it, and ways to protect that information. The intelligence effort is an inter-agency challenge. In the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks, the President has directed the intelligence community “build better, more integrated intelligence capabilities to provide timely, accurate information on threats, wherever they may emerge.”⁴³

Combatant commanders also must play a role in the transformation of the intelligence community. First, they must determine the type of information they will require, and request it. Without understanding the capabilities and limitations of the intelligence community, they will be handicapped in this vital area. This means commanders must maintain close liaison with the intelligence community, and work in concert with those involved agencies, both to gain the right support from them, as well as to support their needs. After all, combatant commanders have already developed unique relationships and insights into their own AORs. If intelligence efforts are successful, combatant commanders should be able to avoid or mitigate surprises and have more warning about imminent threats. And, the fact is that without detailed, accurate and timely intelligence, preemptive operations will be completely impossible to prosecute. Old timelines are simply inadequate if rapid reaction is to be available to the President as a preemptive option.

Enhanced Planning Capabilities

Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan is an operation that virtually no one predicted would happen. As a consequence, it is extremely doubtful that CENTCOM had a plan “on the shelf,” awaiting an execution order. Yet, CENTCOM quickly planned and executed the operation at the President’s direction, very likely in an extremely stressed environment. But, the GWOT is bound to require similarly short-notice and equally unpredictable operations in the future. As a result, regional combatant commanders must transform and enhance their planning capabilities to handle such situations. Planning in the future must account for the potential for short-notice, covert, preemptive operations that must take place within hours of receiving an execution order.

A cadre of planners, with expertise in the various functional areas, as well as liaison officers from components, other combatant commands, other agencies and coalition partners, will have to be trained for such operations, and planning tools will need to be developed. Unprecedented flexibility must be built into planning systems, without which the range of responses will be much more limited than the President desires. Furthermore, as emphasized before, planners must coordinate with other combatant commanders, as well as other agencies; for without such coordination, they will not have the “big picture” perspective required to effectively plan for such operations.

The various functions must be included within planning, as well as execution, and adapted. For example, logistics for preemptive operations may necessarily be different from more traditional operations. Certainly, greater flexibility in logistics will be needed. Some preemptive operations will require logistics sustainment in places not previously considered, such as during Operation Enduring Freedom. Other considerations like the development of appropriate rules of engagement (ROE) must be accounted for. In preemptive operations the ROE may also be different from those of a major theater war. The combatant commander and his staff must shift their thinking in areas such as these.

Command and Control (C2) and Force Structure

New ideas for very responsive and flexible C2 must be developed by regional combatant commanders in order to ensure that preemptive operations can be planned, ordered with appropriate information disseminated and executed effectively and quickly. New technology can help in some respects, but the entire process of conducting C2, which involves a great deal of human decision-making and interaction, must be scrutinized. Command structures may need to be streamlined for short-fused operations, for example.

Hand-in-hand with C2 reevaluation, a review of force structure will need to be conducted. Combatant Commanders' force requirements have largely been driven by planning for major theater wars. With the element of preemption incorporated into strategy, commanders will need to have forces tailored, trained and ready to conduct anything from highly planned major operations to very quick response, small-scale operations within their AORs. Essentially, they will need a broader portfolio of military capabilities at their disposal, and the means to protect those forces. Commanders may need to have forces on ready alert for preemptive, quick response to an imminent threat.

Recommendation

Regional combatant commanders will still be required to plan for their traditional operations. But, they need experts to build the infrastructure for preemptive operations planning, because such operations are “a different animal” than the U.S. military has encountered in the past. There is a wide range of options associated with preemption and a great deal of flexibility that necessarily must be built into planning. At a minimum, regional combatant commanders should establish specialized cells for preemptive operations with the capability to reach out to the various agencies and commands to build the support systems required for preemptive operations, and then to plan and to execute those operations. With specialists at the ready for such contingencies, preemptive operations will become integrated into the day-to-day planning operations of regional combatant commanders.

SOCOM provides a model with their TSOCs, which could be useful for regional commanders to ensure they are able to plan and execute preemptive operations effectively. A sort of “preemptive” or fast response operations center, dedicated to planning for and executing preemptive operations in various areas could be used. In more major preemptive

operations, a joint task force will likely need to be put into place that is at least partially composed of the combatant commander's experts in preemptive planning and operations.

The President indicated that the establishment of forward basing, combined with U.S. military forward presence, globally will be important. Both are key if commanders are to be ready to execute preemptive operations. Such basing and presence help show U.S. resolve and may help deter conflict, but also, they are a product of carefully cultivated and fostered relationships with other countries. And, when necessary, U.S. forces can be closer to their physical objectives when preemption is necessary.

Conclusion

It is important, then, that combatant commanders focus on laying the groundwork early for preemptive operations. They need to build unprecedented levels of flexibility into their plans ensure they have the force structure to accomplish preemptive operations. They must also cultivate close relationships internationally, interagency and within DoD, and gain understanding of the new capabilities of each as transformation occurs. Commanders must shift their thought processes. While one, specific formula cannot necessarily be applied to regional combatant commanders, across the board, they certainly must adapt. Already, CENTCOM stands as a tested example, but the transformation process has only just begun. General Franks has certainly learned lessons from his experiences in Afghanistan and was able to translate some of those lessons to Operation Iraqi Freedom. But, again, the military arm of our nation's national security assets must continue to look to the future, even as they focus on today's threat. The enemy is responsive and will alter their own ways of waging war to counter our efforts, so the U.S. must continue to be flexible and innovative.

Notes

¹ The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002), 15.

²*Ibid.*, 6.

³*Ibid.*, 15.

⁴ John Lewis Gaddis, "A Grand Strategy of Transformation," *Foreign Policy* 133, (November/December 2002), available from <<http://80-proquest.umi.com.ezlib.nwc.navy.mil/pqdweb?Did=000000232256031&Fmt=4&Deli=1&Mtd=1&Idx=7&Sid=1&RQT=309>>; accessed 28 March 2003.

⁵ The White House, *NSS*, 15.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ "United States: Caveat Pre-Emptor; The Bush Doctrine," *The Economist* 363, (22 June 2002), available from Naval War College Databases, ProQuest [database on-line] <<http://80-proquest.umi.com.ezlib.nwc.navy.mil/pqdweb?Did=000000127693611&Fmt=3&Deli=1&Mtd=1&Idx=1&Sid=1&RQT=309>>; accessed 28 March 2003.

⁸ Marvin Leibstone, "America's Post-9/11 National Security Strategy," *Military Technology* 26, no. 11 (November 2002), available from Naval War College Databases, ProQuest [database on-line] <<http://80-proquest.umi.com.ezlib.nwc.navy.mil/pqdweb?Did=000000274390931&Fmt=4&Deli=1&Mtd=1&Idx=1&Sid=4&RQT=309>>; accessed 28 March 2003.

⁹ The White House, *NSS*, 13.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 29.

¹¹ The White House, *Unified Command Plan* (Washington, DC: The White House, 30 April 2002), 1.

¹² The Pentagon, *United States Department of Defense News Transcript: Backgrounder with Senior Defense Officials on Special Operations* (Washington, DC: The Pentagon, 7 January 2003) available from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2003/t01072003_t107bkgd.html, accessed on 12 May 2003.

¹³ U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Special Operations Given Larger Role in War on Terrorism: Defense Department Report: Rumsfeld, Myers Briefing 7 January 2003," available at <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/03010701.htm>, accessed on 29 March 2003.

¹⁴ Rowan Scarborough, "'Special Ops' Gets OK to Initiate its Own Missions," *The Washington Times*, 8 January 2003, accessed at <<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20030108-12935202.htm>>.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Glen W. Goodman, "Expanded Role for Elite Commandos," *Armed Forces Journal International* 140, no. 6 (February 2003), 36.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Philip Dine, "Covert Ops," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 13 April 2003, B-1.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *Ibid.*

²³ William B. Scott, "STRATCOM to Be All-New Command," *Aviation Week and Space Technology* 157, no. 5 (29 July 2002), available at http://newfirstsearch.oclc.org/WebZ/FTFETCH?sessionid=sp02sw03-46952-dfscyvar-n8jekz:entitypagenum=8:0:rule=990:ftsource=multi:fetchtype=fulltext:dbname=PerAbs_FT:recno=2:resultset=4:ftformat=ASCII:format=T:isbillable=TRUE:numrecs=1:isdirectarticle=FALSE:entityemailfullrecno=2:entityemailfullresultset=4:entityemailftfrom=PerAbs_FT, accessed 29 March 2003.

²⁴ United States Strategic Command Website, available at <http://www.stratcom.mil>, accessed 13 May 2003.

²⁵ Scott.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ Melana Zyla Vickers, "The Essentials for Pre-Emption," Fox News Channel News Website, available at <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,56826,00.html>, accessed 12 May 2003.

²⁹ William B. Scott, "'New' Strategic Command Could Assume Broader Roles," *Aviation Week and Space Technology* 157, no. 16 (14 October 2002), available at http://newfirstsearch.oclc.org/WebZ/FSQUERY?sessionid=sp02sw03-46952-dfscyvar-n8jekz:entitypagenum=18:0:numrecs=1:searchtype=locateFT:dbname=PerAbs_FT:query0=sc%3d%220005-2175+%3F+157+16+63+%3F+%3F%22:format=T:entityfttoprecno=1:next=NEXTCMD%7FFTFETCH:rule=4:dbname=PerAbs_FT:issuesici=0005-2175+2002+157+16:fetchtype=fulltext:tdisplaydbname=PerAbs_FT:thirdpartydbid=77:isbillable=TRUE:isdirectarticle=FALSE:numrecs=1:format=T:ftformat=ASCII:entityemailfullrecno=1:entityrecno=1:entityemailfullresultset=7:entityemailftfrom=PerAbs_FT:%7F, accessed 29 March 2003.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*

³³ The White House, *NSS*, 16.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 14

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*, v.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 14.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 16.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 29.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 9.

⁴¹ National Defense University, Joint Forces Staff College, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 2000*, (Norfolk, Virginia: 2000), 3-29.

⁴² The White House, *NSS*, 30

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 16.

Selected Bibliography

- Alterman, Eric. "The Roamin' Empire." *The Nation*, 276, no. 3 (27 January 2003), 10. Available online: <http://80-proquest.umi.com.ezlib.nwc.navy.mil/pqdweb?Did=000000280164101&Fmt=3&Deli=1&Mtd=1&Idx=1&Sid=10&RQT=309> [28 March 2003].
- Berkowitz, Bruce D. "U.S. Strategy in the Wilderness Years." *Orbis*, 41 (Spring 1997), 299-308. Available online: <http://newfirstsearch.oclc.org/WebZ/FTFETCH?sessionid=sp01sw03-57985-dfsf9oez-y7kusw:entitypagenum=3:0:rule=990:fetchtype=fulltext:dbname=WilsonSelectPlus_FT:recno=1:resultset=1:ftformat=ASCII:format=T:isbillable=TRUE:numrecs=1:isdirectarticle=FALSE:entityemailfullrecno=1:entityemailfullresultset=1:entityemailftfrom=WilsonSelectPlus_FT:>> [29 March 2003].
- Brinkerhoff, John R. "The Late, Great Arsenal of Democracy." *Orbis*, 39 (Spring 1995), 225-235. Available online: http://newfirstsearch.oclc.org/WebZ/FTFETCH?sessionid=sp01sw03-57985-dfsf9oez-y7kusw:entitypagenum=36:0:rule=990:fetchtype=fulltext:dbname=WilsonSelectPlus_FT:recno=1:resultset=8:ftformat=ASCII:format=T:isbillable=TRUE:numrecs=1:isdirectarticle=FALSE:entityemailfullrecno=1:entityemailfullresultset=8:entityemailftfrom=WilsonSelectPlus_FT: [29 March 2003].
- Bromwich, David. "Acting Alone." *Dissent*, 50 (Winter 2003), 19-23.
- Bush, George W. "A Winning Strategy." *The Weekly Standard*, 8, no. 3 (30 September 2002), 9. Available online: <http://80-proquest.umi.com.ezlib.nwc.navy.mil/pqdweb?Did=000000194629631&Fmt=3&Deli=1&Mtd=1&Idx=3&Sid=6&RQT=309> [28 March 2003].
- Caterinicchia, Dan. "DoD Plans Network Attack Task Force," *Federal Computer Week* (Website). Available online: <http://www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/2003/0203/web-net-02-07-03.asp> [12 May 2003].
- _____. "STRACOM Acquires New IT Missions," *Federal Computer Week* (Website). Available online: <http://www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/2003/0203/web-stratcom-02-06-03.asp> [12 May 2003].
- Clinton, Bill. "National Security Strategy Report Released." *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, 5 (1 August 1994), 522-523. Available online: http://newfirstsearch.oclc.org/WebZ/FTFETCH?sessionid=sp01sw03-57985-dfsf9oez-y7kusw:entitypagenum=18:0:rule=990:fetchtype=fulltext:dbname=WilsonSelectPlus_FT:recno=2:resultset=4:ftformat=ASCII:format=T:isbillable=TRUE:numrecs=1:isdirectarticle=FALSE:entityemailfullrecno=2:entityemailfullresultset=4:entityemailftfrom=WilsonSelectPlus_FT: [29 March 2003].

-
- Dine, Philip. "Covert Ops," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, (13 April 2003) B1.
- Fukuyama, Francis. "American Conservatism: Beyond Our Shores." *Wall Street Journal*, 24 (December 2002) A10. Available online: <<http://80-proquest.umi.com.ezlib.nwc.navy.mil/pqdweb?Did=000000270933231&Fmt=1&Deli=1&Mtd=1&Idx=1&Sid=2&RQT=309>> [28 March 2003].
- Gaddis, John Lewis. "A Grand Strategy of Transformation." *Foreign Policy*, 133 (November/December 2002), 50-57. Available online: <http://80-proquest.umi.com.ezlib.nwc.navy.mil/pqdweb?Did=000000232256031&Fmt=4&Deli=1&Mtd=1&Idx=3&Sid=7&RQT=309> [28 March 2003].
- Goodman, Glenn. "Expanded Role for Elite Commandos." *Armed Forces Journal*, 140, no. 6, (February 2003), 34-38.
- Hillen, John. "Defense's Death Spiral." *Foreign Affairs*, 78, no. 4 (July/August 1999), 2-7. Available online: <<http://80-proquest.umi.com.ezlib.nwc.navy.mil/pqdweb?Did=000000042561976&Fmt=3&Deli=1&Mtd=1&Idx=7&Sid=1&RQT=309>> [28 March 2003].
- Jumper, John P. "Global Strike Task Force: A Transforming Concept, Forged by Experience." *Aerospace Power Journal*, (Spring 2001). Available online: <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj01/spr01/jumper.htm>> [12 May 2003].
- Kimball, Daryl G. "National Insecurity Strategy." *Arms Control Today*, 32 (December 2002), 2.
- Krauthammer, Charles. "The Obsolescence of Deterrence." *The Weekly Standard*, 8, no. 13, (9 December 2002)1-4. Available online: http://www.theweeklystandard.com/Utilities/printer_preview.asp?idArticle=1964&R=761 [26 February 2003].
- Leibstone, Marvin. "America's Post-9/11 National Security Strategy." *Military Technology*, 26 (Nov 2002), 11-15. Available online: <http://80-proquest.umi.com.ezlib.nwc.navy.mil/pqdweb?Did=000000274390931&Fmt=4&Deli=1&Mtd=1&Idx=1&Sid=4&RQT=309> [28 March 2003].
- Losman, Donald. "Oil is Not a National Security Issue." *USA Today*, 130, no. 2680 (January 2002), 16-20. Available online: http://newfirstsearch.oclc.org/WebZ/FTFETCH?sessionId=sp01sw03-57985-dfsf9oez-y7kusw:enttypagenum=31:0:rule=990:fetchtype=fulltext:dbname=PerAbs_FT:recno=1:resul tset=7:ftformat=ASCII:format=T:isbillable=TRUE:numrecs=1:isdirectarticle=FALSE:entity mailfullrecno=1:entityemailfullresultset=7:entityemailftfrom=PerAbs_FT: [29 March 2003].

Metz, Steven. "Why Aren't Americans Better at Strategy?" *Military Review*, 77, no. 1 (January/February 1997), 187-190. Available online: <http://80-proquest.umi.com.ezlib.nwc.navy.mil/pgdweb?Did=000000013134303&Fmt=3&Deli=1&Mtd=1&Idx=3&Sid=9&RQT=309> [28 March 2003].

Muravchik, Joshua. "The Bush Manifesto." *Commentary*, 114, no. 5 (December 2002) 23-30. Available online: <http://newfirstsearch.oclc.org/WebZ/FTFETCH?sessionid=sp01sw03-57985-dfsf9oez-y7kusw:enttypagenum=8:0:rule=990:fetchtype=fulltext:dbname=WilsonSelectPlus_FT:recno=2:resultset=2:ftformat=ASCII:format=T:isbillable=TRUE:numrecs=1:isdirectarticle=FALSE:entityemailfullrecno=2:entityemailfullresultset=2:entityemailftfrom=WilsonSelectPlus_FT:> [29 March 2003].

National Defense University, Joint Forces Staff College, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 2000*. Norfolk, VA: 2000.

Nelson, E. Benjamin. "Nelson: DoD Plans Expansion of STRATCOM," (News Release: 19 December 2002). Available online: <http://bennelson.senate.gov/2002/releases/stratcomexpansion.htm> [12 May 2003].

Ohanlon, Michael E., Susan E. Rice and James B. Steinberg. "The New National Security Strategy and Preemption," *The Brookings Institution Policy Brief #113*. Available online: <http://www.brook.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb113.htm> [26 February 2003].

Scarborough, Rowan. "'Special Ops' Gets OK to Initiate its Own Missions." *The Washington Times* (Website), (8 January 2003). Available online: <http://www.washtime.com/national/20030108-12935202.htm> [29 March 2003].

Scott, William B. "'New' Strategic Command Could Assume Broader Roles." *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 157, no. 16 (14 October 2002), 63. Available online: <http://newfirstsearch.oclc.org/WebZ/FSFETCH?fetchtype=fullrecord:sessionid=sp01sw03-57985-dfsf9oez-y7kusw:enttypagenum=46:0:recno=1:resultset=10:format=FI:next=html/record.html:bad=error/badfetch.html:entitytoprecno=1:entitycurrecno=1:numrecs=1> [29 March 2003].

_____. "'STRATCOM' To Be All-New Command." *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 157, no. 5 (29 July 2002), 48. Available online: http://newfirstsearch.oclc.org/WebZ/FTFETCH?sessionid=sp01sw03-57985-dfsf9oez-y7kusw:enttypagenum=50:0:rule=990:fetchtype=fulltext:dbname=PerAbs_FT:recno=1:resultset=11:ftformat=ASCII:format=T:isbillable=TRUE:numrecs=1:isdirectarticle=FALSE:entityemailfullrecno=1:entityemailfullresultset=11:entityemailftfrom=PerAbs_FT: [29 March 2003].

-
- _____. "Joining Space and Strategic Commands Comes With a Price." *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 156, no. 24 (17 June 2002), 34-35. Available online: http://newfirstsearch.oclc.org/WebZ/FTFETCH?sessionid=sp01sw03-57985-dfsf9oez-y7kusw:entitypagenum=43:0:rule=990:fetchtype=fulltext:dbname=PerAbs_FT:recno=1:resultset=9:ftformat=ASCII:format=T:isbillable=TRUE:numrecs=1:isdirectarticle=FALSE:entityemailfullrecno=1:entityemailfullresultset=9:entityemailftfrom=PerAbs_FT: [29 March 2003].
- United States. Executive Office of the President. *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*. Washington, DC: The White House, Office of the President of the United States of America, May 1997.
- _____. *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*. Washington, DC: The White House, Office of the President of the United States of America, December 1999.
- _____. *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*. Washington, DC: The White House, Office of the President of the United States of America, February 1996.
- _____. *National Security Strategy of the United States*. Washington, DC: The White House, Office of the President of the United States of America, August 1991.
- _____. *National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. Washington, DC: The White House, Office of the President of the United States of America, February 2003.
- _____. *The National Security Strategy*. Washington, DC: The White House, Office of the President of the United States of America, September 2002.
- _____. *Unified Command Plan*. Washington, DC: The White House, Office of the President of the United States of America, 30 April 2002.
- United States. United States Department of Defense. "Backgrounder with Senior Defense Officials on Special Operations," *Defenselink* (Website), (7 January 2003). Available online: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2003/t01072003_t107bkgd.html [12 May 2003].
- United States. United States Department of State. "U.S. Special Operations Given Larger Role in War on Terrorism," *U.S. Department of State International Information Programs* (Website), (7 January 2003). Available online: <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/03010701.htm> [29 March 2003].
- United States. United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. *The National Military Strategy*. Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997.
- _____. *The National Military Strategy*, Feb 1995.

Vickers, Melana Zyla. "The Essentials for Pre-emption," *Fox News* (Website). Available online: <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,56826,00.html> [12 May 2003].

Wall, Robert. "Conflict Could Test Special Ops Improvements." *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 155, no. 14 (1 October 2001) 30-31. Available online: <http://80-proquest.umi.com.ezlib.nwc.navy.mil/pqdweb?Did=000000083206721&Fmt=3&Deli=1&Mtd=1&Idx=1&Sid=8&RQT=309> [29 March 2003].

_____. "U.S. Security Strategy Alternatives Emerge." *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 153, no. 20 (13 November 2000), 32-33. Available online: http://newfirstsearch.oclc.org/WebZ/FTFETCH?sessionid=sp01sw03-57985-dfsf9oez-y7kusw:entitypagenum=13:0:rule=990:fetchtype=fulltext:dbname=PerAbs_FT:recno=1:resultset=3:ftformat=ASCII:format=T:isbillable=TRUE:numrecs=1:isdirectarticle=FALSE:entityemailfullrecno=1:entityemailfullresultset=3:entityemailftfrom=PerAbs_FT [29 March 2003].

"United States: Caveat Pre-Emptor; The Bush Doctrine." *The Economist*, 363 (22 June 2002) 29. Available online: <http://80-proquest.umi.com.ezlib.nwc.navy.mil/pqdweb?Did=000000127693611&Fmt=3&Deli=1&Mtd=1&Idx=1&Sid=1&RQT=309> [28 March 2003].